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ABSTRACT 
This paper researches the determinants of incremental financing decisions made by high 
growth companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal dataset, free of survivorship 
bias, covering the financing events of high growth companies for up to eight years. 
Results are generally consistent with the extended pecking order theory controlling for 
constraints imposed by debt capacity. Profitable companies have a preference for internal 
finance, even if they have unused debt capacity. External equity is particularly important 
for unprofitable companies with high debt levels, limited cash flows, high risk of failure 
and significant investments in intangible assets. As a result, findings suggest that high 
growth companies do not deliberately issue external equity, but rather are pushed towards 
external equity when there are no alternatives, such as retained earnings and financial 
debt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although few in number, high growth ventures contribute disproportionately to 
employment and wealth creation in an economy (Storey, 1994). This makes 
organizational growth a central area of research in entrepreneurship and a major policy 
concern. Proper financial management, including raising adequate and sufficient 
financing, is one of the key factors shaping high growth companies (Nicholls-Nixon, 
2005). The purpose of this paper is to offer an insight into the discrete financing decisions 
of predominantly unquoted high growth companies. Information asymmetries are thought 
to be particularly severe in this setting (Frank and Goyal, 2003). We therefore decided to 
focus on the pecking order theory to explain the financing choices of high growth 
companies. The pecking order theory predicts that companies rank the financing 
alternatives by their sensitivity to asymmetric information, which results in the following 
financing hierarchy: first internal finance, second debt financing and finally outside 
equity is only used as a last resort (Myers, 1984). 
The impact of company characteristics on financial decision-making may vary 
according to the research setting (Harris and Raviv, 1991). It is therefore important to test 
financial theories in settings where our knowledge is limited to determine the 
generalizability of the theories across different companies (Cassar, 2004). Although high 
growth companies are subject to the same market forces as any other company, studying 
the financing decisions of high growth companies is germane for a number of reasons. 
First, a recent stream in the finance and growth literature discusses the importance of 
external equity from private equity investors like venture capitalists and business angels 
in the financing of high growth ventures (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Davila et al., 2003; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Conversely, it is assumed that financial debt providers 
such as banks are incapable of adequately financing the growth of especially innovative 
ventures (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 20002; Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). Most studies in entrepreneurial finance have therefore focused on private 
equity financing, ignoring other potentially important sources of financing such as 
retained earnings and debt financing (Eckhardt et al., 2006). In contrast to most 
contributions on the financing of high growth ventures, we do not limit ourselves to 
external equity financing, but empirically consider a diverse range of financing choices, 
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covering internally generated funds, bank financing and external equity. Second, most 
high growth companies have considerable outside financing needs. Internal finance is 
often insufficient to finance high growth (Michaelas et al., 1999; Gompers, 1995). We 
hence expect financial decision-makers in high growth companies to at least consider a 
broader range of financing alternatives compared to those in “Mom and Pop” businesses. 
Hence, we are able to study financing decisions in a setting where it is less likely that 
these decisions will be truncated to using only internal financing (Howorth, 2001). 
By studying incremental financing decisions our research addresses a number of 
drawbacks of previous research focusing on capital structure. First, traditional capital 
structure research does not distinguish between internal financing and external equity 
financing. However, this distinction may be particularly important in our setting 
characterized by high informational asymmetry (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). For 
example, a company with sufficient cash and high information asymmetries should be 
more likely to finance investments internally and hence should be less likely to attract 
additional external equity finance. Second, a company’s capital structure is the aggregate 
of its past financing decisions. Therefore, capital structure research generally masks 
information on the timing of the financing acquired. The characteristics of a firm change 
as it grows, which affects the availability and suitability of different financing options 
(Gompers, 1995). For example, as a company grows it may invest more in tangible 
assets, which can serve as collateral and make more and cheaper bank financing 
available. It can also become more profitable, making internally generated equity 
available. It is therefore important to take into account the dynamic nature of company 
characteristics and financing choices. Further, while most studies research financing 
choices of quoted companies (Fama and French, 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2003; de Haan 
and Hinloopen, 2003, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999, Helwege and Liang, 1996), we 
focus on financing choices of predominantly unquoted companies. Quoted companies 
have, however, more financing options (Harris and Raviv, 1991) due to lower 
information asymmetries.  
From a methodological perspective, the lack of longitudinal studies in 
entrepreneurship research has been described as a major weakness (Davidsson and 
Wiklund, 1999). Our study analyses the incremental financing decisions of companies 
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over a period of up to 8 years, during which all companies in our sample have grown 
extensively. We include start-ups, failed and merged companies, if they have grown 
considerably after start-up or before disappearing as independent entities. This implies 
that our study does not suffer from survivorship bias. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the theoretical background and development 
of the hypotheses. Next, we discuss the data set, where we describe in detail how high 
growth companies are identified, how financing events are defined and how independent 
constructs are measured. Thereafter, we present our research findings, followed by a 
conclusion and avenues for further research. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The pecking order theory is among the most influential theoretical frameworks in 
the financial literature on corporate leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2003). The most common 
argument for a pecking order in financial decision-making is the existence of information 
asymmetries between company managers and investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and 
Myers, 1984)2. While company managers have private information about the value of 
assets in place and future growth options, outside investors can merely estimate these 
values. Faced with the risk of adverse selection, outside investors will demand a discount 
for the securities offered by the company (Akerlof, 1970). The more risky the security, 
the higher the premium will be, as risk exacerbates the effects of information asymmetry 
(Myers, 1984). As a result, companies prefer to finance new investments with retained 
earnings, which are not subject to asymmetric information problems. When internal funds 
are insufficient to meet the financing needs, companies will turn to outside funds. In this 
situation companies are expected to issue the safest securities first as these will suffer less 
from information asymmetries and hence be subject to lower discounts (Myers, 1984). 
This implies companies will start by searching for debt financing and only consider 
outside equity as a last resort. 
                                                 
 
2
 We acknowledge that information asymmetries do not necessarily lead to a financing hierarchy 
(Halov and Heider, 2004). Furthermore, other mechanisms beside informational asymmetry may 
cause a financing hierarchy such as transaction costs (Myers, 1984). 
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The pecking order framework is a theory both about capital structure and about 
how companies finance their projects over time, i.e. incremental financing decisions 
(Fama and French, 2005). Following the pecking order theory, a firm has no well-defined 
target debt ratio. The observed debt ratio reflects the cumulative requirement for external 
financing over time (Myers, 1984). In this paper the focus is on the pecking order theory 
as a framework to understand incremental financing decisions. Consequently, this 
research is in line with previous studies such as Helwege and Liang (1996), Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) on the financing choices of quoted 
American companies.  
Previous research directly testing the two main tenets of the pecking order model - 
i.e. (1) companies prefer to finance new investments with retained earnings and (2) 
external equity is only issued as a last resort if outside funds are needed - have offered 
inconclusive and even contradictory results. For example, Helwege and Liang (1996), 
studying a panel of US companies that conducted an IPO in 1983, find that the 
probability of obtaining outside funds is not related to a shortfall in internally generated 
funds, which is in contrast with predictions of the pecking order theory. However, 
consistent with pecking order predictions they find that firms with a cash surplus avoid 
outside financing. Finally, firms accessing the capital market do not follow a pecking 
order when choosing the type of security to offer. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
however, draw a very different picture of the predictive power of the pecking order 
model. Based on a sample of 157 US firms that traded continuously between 1971 and 
1989 they conclude that “the pecking order theory is an excellent first-order descriptor of 
corporate financing behavior, at least in our sample of mature corporations” (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999, pp.242). Frank and Goyal (2003) show that for a more elaborate 
sample of publicly quoted US companies the greatest support for the pecking order theory 
is found among large firms. Smaller firms which are expected to be more likely to be 
subject to information asymmetries, do not seem to follow a pecking order. Additionally, 
the pecking order theory prediction that high growth companies will end up with high 
debt ratios due to their large financing needs is questioned (Fama and French, 2005). 
Barclay et al. (2006) demonstrate that high growth ventures consistently use less debt 
financing. These findings have led some scholar to conclude that “the pecking order 
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theory works well when it should not and not so well when it should” (Heider, 2003, pp. 
3)   
Despite contradictory empirical findings the motivation behind our choice of the 
pecking order as the main theoretical framework is clear-cut. Particularly, small and high 
growth companies are subject to significant information asymmetries (Frank and Goyal, 
2003). According to the pecking order theory, exactly problems due to information 
asymmetries guide financial decision making (Myers, 1984). Consequently, based on 
theoretical grounds one would expect the pecking order theory to be particularly useful to 
explain financing behaviour in our sample of mostly unquoted high growth companies. 
We hence expect these firms to prefer internally generated funds over external funds if 
possible. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: High growth companies which have more internal funds will be less 
likely to raise additional external debt or equity financing. 
 
Our first hypothesis is not only non-trivial in light of previous contradictory 
empirical evidence. The main competing framework to the pecking order theory, the 
static trade-off theory, predicts a different behavior. The static trade-off theory states 
companies will trade off the benefits of debt, especially tax and agency benefits, against 
the cost of debt, especially bankruptcy and agency costs of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 
1963; Titman, 1984; Myers, 1977). The static trade-off theory predicts companies will 
make incremental financing decisions in such a way that an optimal capital structure is 
obtained. This optimal capital structure is obtained when the marginal benefit of an 
additional dollar amount of debt financing equals its marginal cost. Following the static 
trade-off theory we would expect companies with a lot of internal funds to rebalance their 
capital structure and issue additional outside debt financing, because companies with a lot 
of internal funds, i.e. financial slack, are less likely to fail. Financial slack buffers 
companies from shocks in the environment and allows them to survive during turbulent 
times (Sharfman et al., 1988). Further, additional outside debt financing would mitigate 
potential agency conflicts resulting from abundant internal funds (Jensen, 1986). 
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A particularly important problem for the traditional pecking order theory concerns 
the use of outside equity financing (Fama and French, 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2005). 
Significant external equity issues by high growth ventures are considered to refute the 
pecking order theory (Frank and Goyal, 2003). However, taking a firm’s debt capacity 
into consideration reconciles equity issues by high growth ventures with the pecking 
order theory. Myers (1977) defined debt capacity as the point at which additional debt 
issues would reduce the total market value of a firm’s debt. Lemmon and Zender (2004) 
are among the first to empirically examine the impact of debt capacity considerations on 
financing decisions in a pecking order framework. Using a sample similar to Frank and 
Goyal (2003), they show that the pecking order theory is a good predictor of financing 
behavior for a broad cross-section of firms when controlling for debt capacity. This is 
referred to as the extended pecking order theory (Lemmon and Zender, 2004). 
Furthermore, they show that high growth ventures have more restrictive debt capacity 
constraints and hence have a lower debt capacity. Consequently, exactly high growth 
companies will reach their debt capacity quickly and will be pushed towards issuing 
outside equity. Significant outside equity issues by high growth companies are hence not 
necessarily in contradiction with the pecking order theory when taking debt capacity 
considerations into account. 
Current studies have defined debt capacity as the point at which companies reach 
“sufficiently high debt ratios” that curtail further debt issues (Fama and French, 2005; 
Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Fama and French (2005), 
interpret their finding that more than half of small, unprofitable high growth ventures 
issue outside equity as invalidating the extended pecking order theory. They argue that 
these firms start with low levels of leverage, hence they should be able to raise additional 
debt (Fama and French, 2005). This conclusion reflects a more limited view on debt 
capacity, however, in contrast with the traditional notion of debt capacity as coined by 
Myers (1977), that also takes into account the possibility of the company to repay the 
debt from operational cash flows. Banks are “cash flow lenders”, implying that they 
emphasize firms’ cash flows as the ultimate source of interest and principal repayment, 
rather than “asset lenders” which emphasize collateral (Carey et al., 1998). 
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Undoubtedly “sufficiently high debt ratios” may make it more difficult to get 
additional debt financing. Companies with high leverage have a higher financial risk, 
implying less protection for debt holders, because of the smaller equity buffer on which 
debt holders can rely in case of liquidation (Ooghe and Van Wymeersch, 2003). 
However, contrary to the narrow definition of debt capacity, even companies with low 
leverage may have no or very limited debt capacity. Take for example privately held 
biotechnology companies. These companies typically require large amounts of outside 
financing (Corroleur et al., 2004). Despite this European biotechnology companies 
exhibit very low leverage ratios (EuropaBio, 2006). However, typically no or insufficient 
cash flows are available (Corroleur et al., 2004). This implies that while debt levels are 
low these companies have no capacity to attract financial debt due to their inability to 
carry out debt related payments (i.e. interests and principal amount). Accumulating fixed 
commitments, which increase liquidity risk (i.e. a company’s inability to carry out the 
fixed payments causing financial distress), will at a certain point reduce the total value of 
debt. As a result, firms with low cash flow may find that issuing additional debt is not 
advantageous to outside equity or even impossible and are forced to move further down 
the pecking order to outside equity (Helwege and Liang, 1996). Hence, we argue that 
debt capacity is not only determined by a firm’s leverage, but also by its capacity to carry 
out the fixed debt related payments. High growth companies with limited debt capacity 
are expected to be pushed towards issuing external equity (Lemmon and Zender, 2004). 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: High growth companies with limited debt capacity will be more 
likely to raise additional external equity financing instead of external debt financing. 
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3. METHOD AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The empirical evidence of this paper is based on a database containing detailed 
yearly financial statement data of all Belgian companies from 1994 until 2004. Belgium 
has a bank-based financial system3. The most important source of external financing 
within firms is bank debt. Issuing public debt is an extremely rare event for Belgian 
companies. Furthermore, only a minority of Belgian companies are quoted on the stock 
exchange. The private equity market, however, is quite well-developed compared to some 
other Continental European countries (Reynolds et al., 2000). 
All Belgian limited liability companies, irrespective of their size, have to file detailed 
financial statement information with the Belgian National Bank. For each year between 1997 and 
2004 we select all firms that are (a) active in Flanders and Brussels (the two most developed 
regions in Belgium comprising the majority of economic activity) and (b) employ at least 10 
people (in order to exclude micro-companies and companies founded for non-economic 
purposes). Both independent companies and companies which belong to a company group 
structure are included. Additionally, both companies starting up within the time frame of this 
study and firms disappearing from the database, because they failed or were taken over, are 
included. Therefore, there is no survivorship bias in our study, which is an important advantage 
compared to the majority of other finance studies. This results in a data set of 32,754 companies 
active over at least some period during the time frame of our study. 
In what follows, we first discuss how high growth companies are identified. Second, we 
develop the measures of financing events. Finally, we discuss the independent variables. 
                                                 
 
3
 Other examples of so-called bank-oriented countries are Germany, Japan and France, as opposed 
to market-oriented countries like the UK, US and Canada. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that 
the difference between the two types of financial systems is not so much present in the level of 
leverage, but are more likely to be reflected in the choice between public (e.g. stocks and bonds) 
and private financing (e.g. bank loans and venture capital financing).   
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3.1. Identifying high growth companies 
Previous organizational growth research is often criticized because it does not 
take into account the multidimensional nature of growth. The classification of a company 
as a high growth company depends on the growth concept and growth formula used 
(Delmar et al., 2003). We explicitly take into account the multidimensional nature of 
growth. First, we use different growth concepts, such as sales, employees, total assets, 
cash flow and added value. The use of different concepts gives richer information and is 
therefore better than the use of a single indicator (Weinzimmer et al., 1998). Second, we 
use both absolute and relative growth measures following Davidsson and Wiklund 
(1999). While absolute growth measures tend to favor larger companies, relative growth 
measures tend to favor smaller companies. Although compound measures have been 
developed to tackle this problem (e.g. the Birch-index (Birch, 1987)), these measures lack 
a conceptual basis (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1999). 
We calculated the growth of all companies in our database using five growth 
concepts (sales, employees, total assets, cash flow or added value) and two growth 
formulas (absolute versus relative). Growth in each year is measured as a moving average 
of the growth rate in the previous three years. From each of ten yearly rankings (two 
growth formulas x five growth concepts), we selected the growth champions, i.e. the first 
percentile of growers. In order to be selected in our sample as a high growth company, a 
company had to be for at least two years among the first percentile4. More specifically, 
this means that a company has to be minimum twice among the top 250 companies in 
Flanders and Brussels in one of ten growth dimensions. 2,077 companies were selected in 
this way. Only 57 of the selected companies are quoted on a stock exchange, the other 
high growth companies are privately held companies. 
The yearly absolute growth in added value is at least €5,256,179 for added value 
growers, €4,067,419 for cash flow growers, €52,269,000 for total asset growers, 
€21,619,000 for revenue growers and 46 employees for employment growers. The cut off 
yearly relative growth rate lies between 317% (for revenue growers) and 2406% (for 
                                                 
 
4
 We require a company to be at least twice among the first percentile in order to exclude erratic 
or one-shot growth. 
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added value growers). These descriptive statistics clearly indicate that only top growth 
companies are considered. Similar growth rates have been reported by Markman and 
Gartner (2002) when studying the link between extraordinary growth and profitability in 
Inc. 500 high growth companies.  
Some descriptive statistics on the sample of high growth companies are 
interesting in their own respect. In line with the results of Delmar et al. (2003) the growth 
concept and growth formula have a profound impact on the companies selected as high 
growth companies. The overlap between the different types of high growth companies is 
low, especially for relative growth. The highest overlap between the different samples of 
high growth companies is between absolute growth in added value and absolute growth in 
revenues, which is only 54%. The average age of the high growth companies in the 
sample is 22 years. However, there is a remarkable difference between absolute growers 
and relative growers with the average age being respectively 28 and 16 years. Although 
the majority (71%) of high growth companies are in existence over the entire time frame 
of the study, 22% of the companies are founded in 1997 or later and 7% of the companies 
disappear due to company failure or a takeover.  
Table I shows the sector distribution of the high growth companies. It is 
remarkable that high growth companies are active in all sectors of the economy, with a 
high prevalence in the transportation and communication sector (31.49%), the building 
and civil engineering industry (23.83%) and in the distributive trades, hotels, catering and 
repairs sector (13.34%). It is noteworthy that around 80% of the high growth companies 
are active in industries that are generally considered low tech.  
Insert Table I about here 
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3.2. Dependent variables: financing events 
The dependent incremental financing event variables are constructed following 
Marsh (1982), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and de Haan and Hinloopen (2003). A first way 
to finance projects is with retained earnings. When the net increase of retained earnings 
within a year exceeds 5% of total assets we define this as an internal financing event. The 
threshold value of 5% is used to assure that the focus of the analyses is on relatively 
substantial financing events and guarantees consistency with previous studies. Second, 
firms are coded as using financial debt if there is a yearly net increase of outstanding 
financial debt which exceeds 5% of total assets. Finally, firms are coded as using external 
equity financing when there is a net increase in external equity of at least 5% of total 
assets. Firms may of course use different types of financing together. As a result, 
financing events are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, all financing events are 
measured on a yearly basis. Consequently, multiple financing events in one year are 
coded as one large issue. This is appropriate as firms seem to actively rebalance their 
capital structure on average about once a year (Leary and Roberts, 2004). Finally, this 
approach makes that we study financing decisions conditional upon firm’s financing 
needs, which is conventional in related studies (e.g. de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003, pp. 
667). 
Insert Table II about here 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent discrete financing events are reported 
in Table II. Each year, more than half of the high growth ventures resort to internal 
finance or raise external financing. Over the eight year frame of our study, 92% of the 
ventures have at least one financing event and the median number of financing events 
equals 4. This suggests that being able to attract sufficient financial resources and high 
growth are interrelated. 
Further, it is often assumed that rapidly growing ventures have insufficient internal funds 
to finance their growth internally (Michaelas et al., 1999; Gompers, 1995). Table II shows that 
financial debt is indeed the most common financing route, accounting for 45% of the financing 
events. Internal finance is the second most frequently used way to finance growth: 39% of the 
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financing events are increases in retained earnings. Finally, only 16% of the financing events 
relate to raising external equity financing. However, nearly 44% of the companies in our sample 
raise at least once outside equity financing. Consistent with Ou and Haynes (2006), who study the 
acquisition of external equity capital by small ventures, the descriptive statistics indicate that even 
for high growth companies the current emphasis on the importance of external equity finance in 
the literature may be somewhat overstated. Although external equity is undeniably an important 
source of finance, almost 85% of the financing events relate to retained earnings and financial 
debt. 
Table II further shows the average size of the financing events (excluding the cases 
without a financing event). The median size of internal financing events equals 15% of total 
assets, while the median debt issue equals 14% of total assets. Consistent with previous research 
(Baeyens and Manigart, 2006; Helwege and Liang, 1997), the largest median issue size is for 
external equity issues with 21% of total assets. This shows that although equity is issued less 
often than debt, the average equity issue size is larger compared with debt issues or with the use 
of internal funds.  
 
3.3. Independent variables 
All independent variables are lagged one year in order to avoid problems of 
reverse causality. Where appropriate, independent variables are scaled by total assets in 
order to standardize the variables and make them comparable for companies with a 
different size. Furthermore, all the independent variables are calculated using book 
values5. Below we define the independent and control variables. 
As proxies for the amount of internal finance available within the venture we use 
its profitability ratio, measured as earnings on total assets, the amount of cash and 
marketable securities on total assets and the pay-out ratio, measured as dividends on total 
assets. Debt capacity is proxied by leverage and cash flow. Leverage is operationalized as 
a company’s debt ratio (financial debt on total assets). Furthermore, we include a variable 
indicating if debt is greater than total assets (negative stockholder’s dummy variable). 
Cash flow is operationalized by using the cash flow ratio (i.e. internally generated cash 
                                                 
 
5
 We are mainly studying unquoted high growth companies. Consequently, market values are not 
available. Second, previous research argues that managers have book value rather than market 
value targets (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
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flow on total assets), indicating a company’s ability to support additional debt related 
payments.  
We additionally include a number of control variables related to the static trade-
off theory, which is the main competing theoretical framework to the pecking order 
theory (Frank and Goyal, 2005). It is interesting to include these variables in the model 
and see if the pecking order variables hold in a nested model including the variables 
proposed by the static trade-off theory (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Under the static trade-off 
theory tax shields, the expected cost of financial distress and agency costs are expected to 
determine financing decisions. We include two types of tax shields, debt tax shields 
(interests on total assets) and non-debt tax shields (depreciations on total assets). The 
expected cost of financial distress depends on the probability of trouble and the value lost 
if trouble comes (Myers, 1984). Our proxy for the probability of financial distress is the 
OJD-score, is similar to the Altman Z-statistic, but adapted to the Belgian context. A 
lower score indicates a higher risk of failure. Furthermore, we use asset structure 
operationalized as the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets, as a proxy for 
the cost of financial distress. Agency costs are particularly prevalent in a setting 
characterized by considerable future growth options. Firms generally engage in research 
and development to generate growth options (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Consequently, 
we use the ratio of intangible assets on total assets to operationalize agency costs.  
Other general control variables, reflecting organizational size (i.e. natural 
logarithm of total assets), previous debt financing (i.e. dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
venture acquired debt financing in the previous year, zero otherwise) and previous 
external equity financing (i.e. dummy variable equal to 1 if the venture acquired external 
equity in the previous year, zero otherwise) are included in the model. Furthermore, we 
included year and industry dummy variables in the analysis to control for time and 
industry effects. Table III reports the correlations for the continuous independent and 
control variables. All correlations are lower than 0.50, except for the correlation between 
the probability of distress (OJD score) and the debt ratio.  Because of multicollinearity 
concerns we did not include the OJD variable in the multiple regressions. 
Insert Table III about here 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Independent variables by issue type 
Table IV shows the independent and control variables by issue type. While the 
average earnings on total asset ratio is positive for companies resorting to internal 
finance, companies issuing external debt and equity finance have on average negative 
earnings. Companies issuing external finance have on average lower pay-out ratios than 
companies resorting to internal finance. Companies issuing external finance have higher 
debt ratios compared to companies resorting to internal finance. Particularly noteworthy 
is that more than 20% of external equity issues are related to companies that have 
negative book value of shareholders’ equity in the previous year6. This is a considerable 
group of companies which previous studies in capital structure research sometimes 
explicitly remove from their dataset (e.g. Heyman et al., 2007; Sogorb-Mira, 2005), 
leading to potentially biased results. Furthermore, external equity issuers have much 
lower internally generated cash flow ratios compared to debt issuers. These findings are 
consistent with companies issuing external equity being closer to or having reached their 
debt capacity.  
Insert Table IV about here 
Some interesting observations occur with respect to the control variables related 
to financial distress and intangible assets. Companies issuing external equity have a 
higher risk of failure compared to internal finance users and debt issuers. Furthermore, on 
average external equity issuers hold less tangible assets, which can serve as collateral, 
compared to debt issuers. Finally, companies issuing external equity finance have the 
highest average ratio of intangible assets on total assets.  
 
                                                 
 
6
 In the entire sample less than 9% of all financing events are related to companies that have 
negative shareholders’ equity in the previous year. 
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table V presents the results of maximum likelihood multinomial logit analyses 
with three possible outcomes: internal finance, financial debt and external equity 
financing. We correct for the dependence among the outcomes with respect to the 
financing events for the same company. Consequently, we take into account that the 
observations are not independent within companies. This affects the estimated standard 
errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimates (VCE). The Huber-White-
Sandwich estimator of variance is used in order to obtain robust variance estimates. 
Panel A of table V reports the multinomial logit analysis with internal finance as the base 
outcome. More profitable companies prefer to finance investments internally. The effect of 
profitability is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. The odds of 
issuing debt or outside equity are respectively more than 12 and 32 times lower for a one 
percentage-point increase in the profitability ratio. This is consistent with capital structure 
research on private held firms reporting a negative relationship between profitability and the debt 
ratio (e.g. Heyman et al., 2007; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Companies with more cash and marketable 
securities are less likely to issue financial debt. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1 and 
offer support for the traditional pecking order theory. 
Insert Table V about here 
Companies using internal financing have a higher debt capacity. Companies with 
lower debt ratios, positive stockholders’ equity and higher cash flow are more likely to 
resort to internal financing. For example, the predicted increase in the odds of issuing 
debt or equity is respectively more than 4.5 and 1.8 for a one percentage-point increase in 
a company’s debt ratio. This finding is contrary to the predications of the static trade-off 
theory. One would expect companies with a lot of debt capacity to attract financial debt. 
This would allow profitable companies to benefit from the tax advantage of additional 
interest payments. Consistent with Lemmon and Zender (2004), we find evidence that 
profitable high growth companies with a lot of debt capacity prefer to retain their debt 
capacity.  
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Panel B of table V reports the multinomial logit analysis with financial debt as the 
base outcome. The results show that more profitable companies prefer to finance 
investments with debt, while more cash rich companies prefer to finance investments 
with external equity. The negative coefficient of the debt ratio variable indicates that 
companies with higher debt ratios are more likely to issue additional debt. However, high 
growth companies with extremely high debt ratios as proxied by the negative 
stockholders’ equity dummy are more likely to issue external equity instead of debt 
financing. As an alternative specification to the reported model, which includes a dummy 
variable for negative stockholders’ equity, we include the squared term of the debt ratio 
variable7. While the coefficients of all other variables remain stable, the squared term is 
negative and significant (p-value = 0.001). It indicates that in line with our hypothesis 
high debt levels increase the probability of issuing external equity. Furthermore, the 
predicted increase in odds of issuing additional debt financing compared to external 
equity increases by 1.26 for a one percentage-point increase in cash flow ratio. Therefore, 
our findings support hypothesis 2: high growth companies with high debt levels and low 
cash flows are more likely to attract additional external equity financing. 
Looking at the control variables proposed by the static trade-off theory we find no 
significant impact of debt and non-debt tax shields on the decision to issue debt versus 
outside equity. The analyses in table V are performed without the bankruptcy risk 
indicator because of multicollinearity concerns. Unreported analyses confirm that in line 
with the static trade-off theory companies with a high risk of failure are more likely to 
attract external equity financing. This finding is consistent with the results from Baum 
and Silverman (2004), which indicate that private equity investors are investing in 
ventures on the edge of short term failure. Results do not confirm the importance of asset 
structure. Although companies with more tangible assets are more likely to issue outside 
funding (Panel A), the level of tangible assets does not discriminate between outside debt 
and equity issuers (Panel B).  
                                                 
 
7
 We use mean centered values to reduce potential multicollinearity problems as advised by Neter 
et al. (1996). 
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The results do indicate that companies with more intangible assets are more likely 
to fund their investment projects with external equity financing rather than with debt 
financing or internal equity. This last finding offers further evidence that the debt 
capacity of growth options may not only be lower compared to the debt capacity of assets 
in place, but may actually be negative (Barclay et al., 2006). 
The coefficient of the size variable indicates that larger companies are less likely 
to attract outside financing. Finally, it is worth noting the coefficients of the previous debt 
and external equity financing dummies. Similar to Helwege and Liang (1996) and de 
Haan and Hinloopen (2003) the results show that companies previously issuing external 
financing are more likely to de so in the future. We additionally show that companies 
issuing financial debt are more likely to do so in the future, while previous issuers of 
external equity are more likely to attract additional external equity in the future. These 
results indicate the existence of a learning effect in the search for financing (e.g. de Haan 
and Hinloopen, 2003; Jansson, 2002).  
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
Additional analyses have been conducted to test for the robustness of the main 
results. We conducted separate analyses for the companies that were in the database over 
the total observation period and we contrasted small versus large high growth companies 
(median split on total assets) and absolute versus relative high growth companies. Results 
remained essentially unchanged. First, less profitable companies are more likely to issue 
outside financing and prefer to retain debt capacity. Second, companies with limited debt 
capacity are more likely to issue external equity. 
Removing the companies with negative shareholder’s equity (i.e. companies with 
excessive debt levels) from the analyses slightly changed the results: the squared term of 
the debt ratio was not significant. The finding is in line with the traditional pecking order 
theory, which indicates that high growth companies will end up with high debt ratios due 
to managers’ reluctance to issue outside equity. Companies with lower cash flow ratios, 
however, are more likely to issue outside equity financing. These results confirm that 
debt capacity is not only determined by the level of debt but also by the capacity to carry 
additional debt-related payments. Excessive debt levels, as indicated by negative equity, 
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will push companies to issue external equity. This finding shows that removing 
companies with negative equity from the sample biases the results. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Financial capital is one of the key resources a company requires to support its 
growth. This paper researches financial decision making in a high growth setting. 
Although previous research indicates that financial management is of paramount 
importance in a high growth setting, little is known about financial policy of high growth 
companies. Previous studies focused mainly on professional venture capital as a key 
financing source for high growth businesses, ignoring other frequently used alternatives. 
Using the pecking order theory we provide testable hypotheses of financing behavior in a 
high growth setting. Our results are based on a longitudinal dataset of financing decisions 
made by high growth companies over an eight year period. Startups and companies 
disappearing from our database, because of company failure or mergers and acquisitions, 
are included.  
Our results are consistent with the extended pecking order theory, taking into 
account constraints due to limited debt capacity. More profitable companies prefer to 
finance investments internally. Companies using internal finance stockpile debt capacity. 
These companies do not attract debt financing, while the static trade off theory would 
suggest that exactly these companies should get additional debt financing in order to gain 
from debt tax shields and discipline imposed by fixed debt-related payments. Companies 
with excessive leverage and lower cash flow ratios are more likely to issue outside equity 
financing. It is striking that stockholders’ equity is negative in more than 20% of the 
companies in the year previous to getting external equity. Companies issuing external 
equity may therefore be unable to attract more debt financing given the excessive 
leverage and difficulty to support additional debt-related payments. Finally, companies 
which invest more heavily in intangible assets are more likely to attract additional 
external equity.  
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Together these results indicate that high growth ventures do not deliberately issue 
additional external equity financing, but rather are pushed towards external equity when 
there are few alternatives. This finding is remarkably consistent with previous research 
focusing on financial decisions in private equity versus non-private equity backed firms 
in Belgium (Baeyens and Manigart, 2005). External equity is particularly important for 
unprofitable companies investing more heavily in intangible assets with high debt levels, 
limited cash flows and high risk of failure. Consequently, external equity is crucial as it 
allows some high growth firms to undertake investments for which no financing 
alternatives may be available.  
Our results are important for academics. External equity financing is undeniably 
important for high growth companies needing financing beyond their debt capacity. However, 
contrary to the current focus in the literature on the importance of external equity finance for high 
growth companies, internal finance and debt are the most frequently used financing alternatives 
by the majority of high growth companies. Nevertheless, more insight is needed into how 
managers make financial decisions. Are managers pushed towards outside equity financing 
because of the economic costs associated with it (e.g. Amit et al., 1998), the fear of loosing 
control and independence (e.g. Manigart and Struyf, 1997) or lack of knowledge about financing 
(e.g. Van Auken, 2001)? Furthermore, researchers should move beyond the current focus on 
outside equity. Similar to the majority of other studies on company financing, we focus on the 
financing obtained. Therefore, we are unable to answer questions as: How does the search for 
financing look like? Do company managers prefer to target one or a few investors or do they 
target multiple potential investors? How do the initial financing decisions influence subsequent 
financing decisions (e.g. Baeyens and Manigart, 2006)? Our results hint there might be a learning 
effect in the acquisition of financial resources. Companies issuing financial debt or outside equity 
are more likely to issue respectively financial debt and outside equity in the future. 
Our results are also important for management practice. By studying the financing 
behavior of high growth companies, entrepreneurs can gain a more thorough insight into financial 
policies related to high growth. Our results are important for financial intermediaries. We offer 
additional evidence that high growth companies are pushed towards external equity, only to be 
raised when internally generated funds are lacking and when the debt capacity is exhausted.  
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Finally, our results are important for policymakers. Governments are primarily focusing 
on programs to increase the supply of external equity financing to innovative and growing 
ventures. An important insight for government officials it that external equity does not seem to be 
the preferred way through which ventures finance high growth. Our research indicates the 
importance of internal finance in the financing of investment projects by high growth companies. 
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Distribution of sample firms by industry 
 
TABLE I 
Distribution of sample firms by industry 
     
0  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 14 0.67%
1  Energy and water 103 4.96%
2  Extraction and processing of non-energy producing minerals and derived products; chemical industry 225 10.83%
3  Metal manufacture; mechanical and instrument engineering 87 4.19%




 Building and civil engineering 495 23.83%
6  Distributive trades, hotels, catering, repairs 277 13.34%
7  Transport and communication 654 31.49%
8  Banking and finance, insurance, business services, renting 27 1.30%
9  Other services 61 2.94%
  
 









Sample split according to financing types 
 
TABLE II: 
Sample split according to financing type 
Number of financing 
events: Internal Financial debt External Equity Total 
 
Number of firms with 
new issue: 
 
Number of firms in 
sample: 
              
% of firms in sample with new 
issue: 
1997 365 487 169 1021 798 1450 55.03% 
1998 400 474 181 1055 839 1562 53.71% 
1999 435 543 210 1188 937 1667 56.21% 
2000 457 649 223 1329 1027 1804 56.93% 
2001 458 590 241 1289 1040 1874 55.50% 
2002 457 515 189 1161 970 1883 51.51% 
2003 494 461 172 1127 950 1869 50.83% 
2004 472 337 104 913 784 1573 49.84% 
Total 3538 4056 1489 9083       
Total (%) 38.95% 44.66% 16.39% 100.00%       
                
Issue size/Total 
assets (%):               





Correlation matrix for continuous independent and control variables 
 
TABLE III: 
Correlation matrix for continuous independent and control variables 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Internal finance:   
                      
Profitability ratiot-1 (1) 1.00            
Cash and cash equivalentst-1 (2) -0.055 1.00           
Pay-out ratio





          
Debt ratio t-1 (4) -0.364 -0.017 -0.065 1.00         
Cash flow ratio
 t-1 (5) 0.161 0.102 0.030 0.119 1.00        
Control variables: 
  
            
Tax shields 
  
            
Debt tax shields t-1 (6) -0.055 -0.162 -0.039 0.331 -0.083 1.00       
Non-Debt tax shields t-1 (7) -0.138 0.028 -0.053 0.192 0.291 0.062 1.00      
Financial distress 
  
            
Probability of distress (OJD)
 t-1 (8) 0.300 0.012 0.046 -0.609 0.042 -0.308 -0.027 1.00     
Cost of distress (Asset structure)
 t-1 (9) -0.082 -0.087 -0.080 0.164 0.066 0.071 0.497 -0.004 1.00    
Agency costs 
  
            
Intangible assets
 t-1 (10) -0.126 0.005 -0.033 0.068 0.015 -0.013 0.262 -0.026 -0.006 1.00   
Size






Variables by issue type 
 
TABLE IV: 
Variables by issue type 
  Internal Finance Financial debt External equity 
  Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D.
Internal finance:       
(EARNINGS/TOTAL ASSETS)t-1 0.0412 0.0640 0.1463 0.0080 -0.0170 0.2164 0.0000 -0.0891 0.3142
(CASH AND EQUIVALENTS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0156 0.0698 0.1349 0.0143 0.0556 0.1198 0.0141 0.0767 0.1613
(DIVIDENDS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0000 0.0212 0.0614 0.0000 0.0111 0.0402 0.0000 0.0089 0.0332
  
      
Debt capacity:       
(FINANCIAL DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.5982 0.5532 0.3130 0.8003 0.7863 0.5664 0.7207 0.7184 0.6466
(Negative shareholders’ equity)
 t-1  0.0124   0.1152   0.2058  
(INTERNALLY GENERATED CASH FLOW/TOTAL 
ASSETS)
 t-1 0.2835 0.5275 0.7604 0.2202 0.4305 0.6722 0.0871 0.2723 0.5996
  
      
Control variables:       
Tax Shields       
(INTERESTS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0051 0.0109 0.0147 0.0091 0.0155 0.0205 0.0046 0.0135 0.0218
(DEPRECIATIONS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0184 0.0411 0.0569 0.0284 0.0512 0.0667 0.0160 0.0437 0.0661
  
      
Financial distress       
(OJD-SCORE *)
 t-1 1.0200 1.2190 1.5480 0.350 -0.113 6.541 0.270 -0.799 10.881
(PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT/TOTAL 
ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0494 0.1369 0.1999 0.1034 0.2223 0.2728 0.0450 0.1832 0.2669
  
      
Agency costs       
(INTANGIBLE ASSETS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.0000 0.0147 0.0582 0.0000 0.0195 0.0710 0.0000 0.0277 0.0845
  
      
Ln(TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 10.605 10.206 2.768 9.9554 9.7008 2.8614 9.9554 9.5220 3.2184
Previous debt financing  0.2340   0.4530    0.3509  




Multinomial logit models using robust standard errors 
 
TABLE V: 
Multinomial logit models using robust standard errors* 
 
A. Base outcome =                                           
Internal finance 
B. Base outcome =  
Financial debt 
 Financial debt External equityInternal financeExternal equity 
 Coef. Sign.+ Coef. Sign.+ Coef. Sign.+ Coef. Sign.+ 
Internal finance:         
(EARNINGS/TOTAL ASSETS)t-1 -2.519 *** -3.480 *** 2.519 *** -0.961 *** 
(CASH AND EQUIVALENTS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 -1.077 *** -0.060  1.077 *** 1.018 *** 
(DIVIDENDS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.449  0.582  -0.449  0.134  
 




Debt capacity:         
(FINANCIAL DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 1.512 *** 0.630 *** -1512 *** -0.882 *** 
(Negative shareholders’ equity)
 t-1 0.865 *** 2.282 *** -0.865 *** 1.417 *** 
 
(INTERNALLY GENERATED CASH FLOW/TOTAL  
ASSETS)
 t-1 -0.278 *** -0.513 *** 0.278 *** -0.236 *** 
 




Control variables:         
Tax Shields         
(INTERESTS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 7.616 *** 7.080 ** -7616 *** -0.537  
(DEPRECIATIONS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 -0.759 
 




        
Financial distress         
(OJD-SCORE)
 t-1 





(PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT/TOTAL  
ASSETS)
 t-1 0.889 *** 0.641 *** -0.889 *** -0.248  
 
        
Agency costs         
(INTANGIBLE ASSETS/TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 0.330 
 




        
Ln(TOTAL ASSETS)
 t-1 -0.089 *** -0.087 *** 0.089 *** 0.002  
Previous debt financing 0.577 *** 0.191 ** -0.577 *** -0.386 *** 
Previous external equity financing 0.832 *** 1.555 *** -0.832 *** 0.723 *** 
         
Number of obs. 7896       
Prob. 0.0000       
Pseudo R² 0.1305       
 
* Industry and year dummies are included in the models, but are not reported. 
 
+ 
 Where * indicates significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05 and *** significant at 0.01. 
 
 
